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Abstract Negative events have been used in analyses of various natural language
phenomena such as negative perception reports and negative causation, but their
conceptual and logical foundations remain ill-understood. We propose that linguistic
negation denotes a function Neg, which sends any set of events P to a set Neg(P)
that contains all events which preclude every event in P from being actual. An
axiom ensures that any event in Neg(P) is actual if and only if no event in P is. This
allows us to construe the events in Neg(P) as negative, “anti-P”, events. We present
a syntax-semantics interface that uses continuations to resolve scope mismatches
between subject and verb phrase negation, and a fragment of English that accounts
for the interaction of negation, the perception verb see, finite and nonfinite perception
reports, and quantified subjects, as well as negative causation.
Keywords: negative events, negation, event semantics, syntax-semantics interface, compo-
sitional semantics, continuations, perception reports, negative causation
1 Introduction
Events have featured in semantic analyses of a wide variety of natural language
phenomena such as perception reports, causation, and nominalizations (Parsons
1990 and references therein).
(1) a. I saw Mary leave. Perception report
b. I put the child to sleep by turning off the light. Causation
c. Mary’s departure made John sad. Nominalization
In compositional frameworks, event semantics is often deployed alongside anal-
yses of scope-taking expressions in terms of their counterparts in propositional
or predicate logic. For example, truth-functional linguistic negation (not) is often
analysed in terms of logical negation (¬) (Horn 1989).
An analysis of linguistic negation in terms of logical negation is not by itself
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incompatible with event semantics. For example, Champollion (2011, 2015) and
de Groote & Winter (2015) analyze (2a) as in (2b), disregarding tense.
(2) a. John did not laugh.
b. ¬∃e[laugh(e)∧ag(e) = John]
However, this approach is not equally compatible with all applications of event
semantics. In particular, analyses of perception reports do not mesh well with
analyses of linguistic negation in terms of logical negation (Higginbotham 1983,
2000). For example, sentence (3a) cannot be represented as formula (4a), because
(3a) entails that the speaker saw Mary stay while (4a) is true even if Mary left, as
long as the speaker did not see her leave. If the formula in (4a) captures the truth
conditions of any sentence, it would be (4b). Nor can (3a) be represented as (5a), as
that formula is trivially verified by almost any event.
(3) a. I saw Mary not leave. (Higginbotham 1983)
(4) a. ¬∃e. [leave(e)∧ag(e) = Mary∧ e ∈ [[I saw]]]
b. It’s not the case that I saw Mary leave.
(5) a. ∃e. ¬[leave(e)∧ag(e) = Mary∧ e ∈ [[I saw]]]
In this paper, we take an alternative approach and analyze negative perception reports
like (3a) in terms of negative events. Some negative events are fairly easy to think
about in intuitive terms. For example, the negative event in (3a) can be thought of as
the event of Mary’s staying. Other negative events, however, cannot be paraphrased
so easily, as we see for example with (2a). A non-laughing event is not just any event
that is not a laughing; rather, it is an event that prevents laughing from taking place.
Negative events have figured in analyses of a number of phenomena beyond
perception reports. These include reports of negative causation, such as (6), and
anaphoric reference as in (7) (Higginbotham 1983, 2000); and modification of
negated clauses as in (8) (Przepiórkowski 1999). A related concept appears in
Krifka’s (1989) analysis of temporal modification of negated verb phrases, as in (9).
See Casati & Varzi (2015: Sect. 2.5) for other uses of negative events in the semantic
and philosophical literature.
(6) I kept the child awake by not turning off the light.
(7) [Mary did not leave]i. { Thisi / Mary’s non-departure } made John happy.
(8) Twice, Mary did not go to Paris.
(9) For two hours, Mary did not laugh.
In this paper, we show how negative events can be integrated into standard
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model-theoretic semantics for a suitable fragment of natural language. Following
Higginbotham (1983), we focus on ordinary and quantified perception reports, more
specifically on nonfinite and finite complements on the verb see, such as (3a) and
(10).
(10) I saw (that) Mary did not leave.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we state our fundamental
assumptions concerning the nature of negative events, their relation to ordinary (non-
negative) events, and the way they enter the compositional semantics. In Section
3, we propose an axiom that constrains the behavior of our negative events. Since
previous work has not shown how negative events are introduced in a compositional
fashion, Section 4 discusses various strategies for compositionally deriving the
interpretation of linguistic utterances involving verb phrase negation. This leads us
to Section 5, in which we develop a fragment of English for simple positive and
negative statements, perception reports with (non)finite complements, as well as
reports of negative causation. In Section 6, we discuss previous work formalizing
non-standard treatments of negation in event semantics. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Fundamental assumptions
We begin by stating our fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of negative
events, their relation to ordinary (non-negative) events, and the way they enter the
compositional semantics.
One might conceive negative events as intrinsically negative, independently of
the way they are described, or as negative only under some descriptions but not
others. On the first view, Mary’s non-departure would be an intrinsically negative
event; on the second view, it is negative under the description “not leave” but not
under the description “stay”. While our formalization is compatible with the first
view, we follow the philosophical lead of Bentham (1789: ch. 7, §10) and Varzi
(2006) and assume that events are not negative intrinsically but only under certain
descriptions (namely those that involve linguistic negation).
Our theory rests on the central assumption that events may be actual or non-
actual. Intuitively, actual events are events that are the case, while non-actual events
are conceivable events that are not the case. The distinction between actual and
non-actual entities is not specific to events. Individuals too can be actual, such as
Margaret Thatcher or Barack Obama, or non-actual, such as Mary Poppins or Santa
Claus. In the context of possible world semantics, one may think of actual events as
events that exist at the actual world, and of non-actual events as those that do not;
however, nothing rests on this assumption and one may as well take actuality to be
an unanalyzed property of events.
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Distinguishing between actual and non-actual events allows us to formalize the
notion that two events may preclude each other. By this we mean two events that
cannot co-occur. For instance, Mary’s departure and her non-departure preclude
each other. If she left, we will say that her departure is actual and her non-departure
is non-actual; if she stayed, we will say that it is the other way around.
At the heart of our proposal is the function Neg. We assume that this function
sends every set of events P to a set of events Neg(P), the set of its precluders.
Specifically, Neg(P) contains all and only those events which preclude every event
in P. For a predicate or set P, we will refer to events in P as P-events and to events in
Neg(P) as anti-P events. The intuitive meaning of this function is the following. Let
P be a set of events, such as the set of all of Mary’s departures (actual or otherwise)
on a specific occasion. If Mary left, then one of these events will be actual; if she
stayed, none of these will be. Also, an event will belong to Neg(P) just in case it
precludes Mary’s departure. Since Mary cannot have left and stayed at the same
time, this set will include all of her stayings. If Mary left, none of these events
will be actual; if she stayed, at least one of them will be actual. (A variant of our
system, presented by Bernard (to appear), assumes that Neg(P) sends any P to a
single event; in terms of the present proposal, this corresponds to assuming that
Neg(P) is a singleton set. This assumption does not affect the main aspects of our
system but seems unnecessary, so we drop it here.)
For some instances of P one may identify their precluders with familiar events,
in line with the Bentham and Varzi view. For example, it is fairly intuitive to take
the set of Mary’s departures to have the set of her stayings as its precluders. For
other cases, such as the set of John’s laughings or the set of all events that take place
on a Tuesday, this will not be so easy. What does it mean to be an anti-laughing
or anti-Tuesday event? We refrain from giving an answer here. Our strategy is to
generalize Neg so that it applies to any set whatsoever. The precluders will in some
cases be highly abstract entities, similarly to imaginary numbers in mathematics.
In other cases, they will be concrete entities which can be perceived, can be causes
and effects, and so on. We do not assume that a given precluder can necessarily be
described by any non-negated predicate. The addition of precluders to the model is a
purely technical move with no metaphysical or ontological claims attached to it.
3 An axiom for negative events
Any theory of negation should make predictions about entailment and contradiction
with respect to sentences involving it. When linguistic negation is analyzed in terms
of logical negation, these predictions follow from the well-known behavior of logical
negation in classical systems of propositional and predicate logic. Here, however,
we analyze linguistic negation in terms of precluding events and the Neg function
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rather than in terms of logical negation. We therefore provide an axiom for the Neg
function and show that it gives rise to classical behavior. Our axiom is inspired by a
proposal in Higginbotham (2000), which we discuss in Section 6. Here it is:
(11) Axiom of negation
[∃e ∈ Neg(P). actual(e)]↔ [∀e′ ∈ P. ¬actual(e′)]
This axiom states two things. First, read from left to right, it states that if there is an
actual Neg(P) event, then there is no actual P event. For example, let P be the set of
all of Mary’s departures (actual or not) and Neg(P) the set of all her stayings (actual
or not), as above. Then the left-to-right direction of the axiom states that if Mary
actually stayed, then none of her departures is actual; it cannot be the case that she
both stayed and left. Second, read from right to left, the axiom states that if there
is no actual P event, then there is an actual Neg(P) event; or to put it differently, if
no event in Neg(P) is actual, then one of the events in P is actual. In Mary’s case,
this means that if she did not stay, she must have left; it cannot be the case that she
neither stayed nor left. We may say that two events co-occur if and only if they are
both actual; then this axiom states that P events and Neg(P) events do not co-occur,
and that in all circumstances, at least one of them is actual.
Because we have non-actual events in our ontology, merely existentially quan-
tifying over some event does not ensure that this event is actual. For example, a
formula such as ∃e. rain(e) does not state that it is raining, only that there is a raining
event that may or may not be actual. In terms of possible-world semantics, existence
in this formal sense corresponds to existence at some possible world which may or
may not be the actual world, while actuality corresponds to occurrence in the actual
world.
Under this conception of events, ordinary sentences describe actual and not
merely possible events. To capture this fact, we translate them with an occurrence of
the predicate actual, as in the following example:
(12) a. It is raining.
b. ∃e. actual(e)∧ rain(e)
To translate negative statements, we use the Neg function. Sentence (13a), for
instance, can be translated as (13b), as opposed to (13c). Here and below, we
equate sets with their characteristic functions; thus we make no difference between
{e | rain(e)} and λe. rain(e).
(13) a. It is not raining.
b. ∃e. actual(e)∧ e ∈ Neg(λe′. rain(e′))
c. ¬∃e. actual(e)∧ rain(e)
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Formula (13b) states that some anti-rain event is actual. Because of the axiom of
negation, this is equivalent to asserting that no raining event is actual. In this way,
the usual “non-existence” interpretation of negation in event semantics is preserved.
That is, the axiom of negation makes (13b) and (13c) logically equivalent.
As illustrated in (14a), two negations cancel out; and as (14b) shows, negation is
downward entailing.
(14) a. Mary slept. ⇔Mary did not not sleep.
b. Mary did not eat. ⇒Mary did not eat an egg.
These two properties are ensured by the two following theorems, which are conse-
quences of our axiom:
(15) ∀P. [∃e ∈ P. actual(e)]↔ [∃e ∈ Neg(Neg(P)). actual(e)]
(If there is an actual P event, then there is an actual anti-anti-P event, and
vice versa.)
(16) ∀P. ∀P′ ⊆ P. [∃e ∈ Neg(P). actual(e)]→ [∃e ∈ Neg(P′). actual(e)]
(If there is an actual anti-P event, then for any subset P′ of P, there is an
actual anti-P′ event.)
In addition to preserving the correct truth conditions of negated sentences, the
negative events that the Neg function makes available reify the absence of events of a
certain sort. As mentioned in Section 1, negative events have been previously argued
to be appropriate for the analysis of negated perception reports, negated causation
reports, and other phenomena. We build on these analyses by taking all uses of
verb phrase negation to involve the Neg function. Previous work has not shown how
negative events are introduced in a compositional fashion. The remainder of this
paper presents a concrete proposal to this effect.
4 The compositionality problem
Having presented our foundational notions concerning negative events, we turn
to the task of compositionally deriving the interpretation of linguistic utterances
involving negation. We assume a Neo-Davidsonian approach to event semantics,
in which events are related to individuals by thematic relations such as agent and
theme (Carlson 1984; Parsons 1990).
The main challenge for a compositional semantic implementation is to ensure
that all the relevant information is interpreted in the scope of the Neg function. We
assume that Neg is introduced by VP negation, which takes syntactic scope below the
subject at the surface level. We will focus on information conveyed by the subject,
as in the following sentence:
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(17) Mary did not sleep.
This sentence cannot be taken as relating Mary to an actual anti-sleeping event, as in
(18a). If there was an actual anti-sleeping event, it would preclude all sleeping events
from being actual, even those whose agents are people other than Mary. Clearly, the
only kinds of events that are precluded by the truth of (17) are sleeping events by
Mary. Therefore, we take (17) to state that there is an anti-Mary-sleeping event that
is actual, as (18b).
(18) a. ∃e. actual(e)∧agent(e) = Mary∧ e ∈ Neg(λe. sleep(e))
b. ∃e. actual(e)∧ e ∈ Neg(λe. sleep(e)∧agent(e) = Mary)
The challenge for compositional semantics is to resolve the scope mismatch between
syntax, where not takes scope only over sleep but not over Mary, and semantics,
where Neg takes scope over λe. sleep(e)∧agent(e) = Mary.
There are several well-known strategies for resolving scope mismatches. Here
we adopt a semantic strategy. Specifically, we will assume that negated verb phrases
denote higher-order functions that take their subjects as arguments and internally
reorder the relative scope of subject and negation. The advantage of this strategy is
that it is directly compositional; that is, it does not require a separate level of logical
form or LF (Jacobson 2012).
An alternative approach, which we do not pursue here, would start from the
assumption that the relative scope of subject and negation is determined syntactically.
For example, one could adopt the VP-internal subject hypothesis, according to which
subjects originate within the VP and move out of it to their surface position, where
they are pronounced (Koopman & Sportiche 1991). A nonquantificational subject
like Mary would be interpreted in its original position within the VP, that is, in the
scope of negation.
No matter how the relative scope of subject and negation is determined, a slightly
more complex situation arises in the case of quantificational subjects. When such
a subject appears in the same clause as negation, their relative scope depends on
whether the clause is finite or nonfinite and on whether the quantifier is universal.
Consider first the unembedded case. In (19), the quantifiers somebody and
nobody take scope above negation, while the quantifier everybody can take scope
either above or below negation (Kroch 1974; Beghelli & Stowell 1997). Regarding
nobody, we set aside the phenomenon of negative concord. In the only remaining
interpretation, the two negations cancel out; thus, (19b) means that everybody left.
(19) a. Somebody did not leave. ∃> ¬
b. Nobody did not leave. ¬∃> ¬
c. Everybody did not leave. ∀> ¬ or ¬> ∀
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These quantifiers behave analogously when they are embedded in finite clauses
under perception verbs. That is, (20a) and (20b) are scopally unambiguous, while
(20c) is scopally ambiguous, in exactly the same way as their unembedded counter-
parts in (19).
(20) a. Serge saw that somebody did not leave. ∃> ¬
b. Serge saw that nobody did not leave. ¬∃> ¬
c. Serge saw that everybody did not leave. ∀> ¬ or ¬> ∀
When the same quantifiers are embedded in nonfinite rather than finite clauses
under perception verbs, they always take scope above negation:
(21) a. Serge saw somebody not leave. ∃> ¬
b. Serge saw nobody not leave. ¬∃> ¬
c. Serge saw everybody not leave. ∀> ¬
We assume that in these sentences, the quantifier even takes semantic scope over the
perception verb. For example, (21c) is equivalent to stating that for every person x,
Serge saw x not leave (van der Does 1991).
5 A continuized grammar for negative events
Having sketched various strategies that resolve scope mismatches between subject
and negation, we now present our implementation of the semantic strategy. We rely
on the notion of continuations (Barker & Shan 2014). In a continuized grammar,
some terms are type-raised so as to control the order in which different constituents
in the sentence are evaluated. Here, we use continuations to give VP negation
semantic scope outside of its syntactic scope by adding an extra argument f to all
verbal projections. This is our continuation variable; f is mnemonic for the future
of the derivation. In doing so, we follow Champollion (2015), another continuized
treatment of event semantics. We deviate from Champollion (2015) in our treatment
of negation, as well as by introducing existential quantifiers over events at the
sentence level and not at the level of the verb.
Continuations can be thought of as a communication channel through which
constituents in a higher position (such as subjects) can send information to a lower
position (such as below negation). For instance, in (17), Mary is outside of the scope
of the negated VP but needs to send the information that Mary is the agent into that
scope. In a continuized grammar, Mary can do so through the continuation of the
VP. In the scopally ambiguous sentence (19c), we obtain the inverse-scope reading
Not everybody left by sending the universal quantifier through the continuation of the
negated VP continuation; if we abstain from doing so, the result is the surface-scope
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reading Everybody failed to leave.
5.1 A grammar for simple statements
We follow the standard approach to Neo-Davidsonian compositional semantics and
assume that all verbal projections take an argument of type v, the type of events
(e.g. Carlson 1984; Champollion 2017). We expose the continuation of all verbal
projections by adding an extra argument of type 〈v, t〉. We write e for variables of
type v and f for variables of type 〈v, t〉, such as our continuation variables.
The type of an ordinary verb such as sleep is 〈〈v, t〉,〈v, t〉〉. Since this is also the
type of all verbal projections, we abbreviate it as vp.
(22) JsleepK≡ λ fλe. sleep(e)∧ f (e)
This term expects its continuation f , a set of events, and returns an event predicate
that intersects f with its intrinsic meaning sleep, the set of all sleeping events.
Our lexical entry for VP negation, of type 〈vp,vp〉, is a modifier: it combines
with a verb phrase V and returns a predicate of the same type as V .
(23) JnotK≡ λVλ fλe. e ∈ Neg(λe′. V ( f )(e′))
This entry sends the verb phrase V to which it applies into the scope of a Neg operator.
The resulting predicate, in turn, sends its continuation f into the scope of Neg and V .
This is what allows the continuation f to play the role of a communication channel by
which the subject can send information into the scope of negation. Before illustrating
this with an example, we need to specify a few other aspects of our grammar.
Following Carlson (1984) and much subsequent work, we assume that proper
names associate with thematic roles to yield event predicates. We write θ for
thematic roles, and we also use θ as subscripts to keep track of these roles in the
syntax.
(24) JMaryKθ ≡ λe. θ(e) = Mary
While this term could serve as the continuation of a VP, doing so would use up
the f argument of the VP, thereby closing the communication channel. This would
prevent any additional information from being sent down from a higher position
in the syntactic tree. The following silent type-raising operator ensures that the
communication channel remains open:
(25) ↑≡ λPλVλ f . V (λe. P(e)∧ f (e))
This term is of type 〈〈v, t〉,〈vp,vp〉〉. It sends its argument P (for instance, JMaryKag)
through the continuation of the verb phrase V , but without closing the channel.
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∃e. actual(e)∧ e ∈ Neg(λe′. sleep(e′)∧ag(e′) = Mary)
closure
λS. ∃e. actual(e)∧
S(λe′. >)(e)
λ fλe. e ∈ Neg(λe′.
sleep(e′)∧ag(e′) = Mary∧ f (e′))
↑Maryag
λVλ f . V (λe.
ag(e) = Mary∧ f (e))
(did) λ fλe. e ∈ Neg(
λe′. sleep(e′)∧ f (e′))
not
λVλ fλe. e ∈ Neg(
λe′. V (e′)∧ f (e′))
sleep
λ fλe. sleep(e)∧ f (e)
Figure 1 Deriving “Mary did not sleep”.
Following standard practice in event semantics, we assume that at the top of
every sentence an existential closure operation applies:
(26) closure≡ λS. ∃e. actual(e)∧S(λe′. >)(e)
In our system, this closure operator serves a double purpose. First, it existentially
quantifies over an actual event and passes it to the sentence S; second, it closes off
the continuation of S by using the trivial predicate λe′. >, which holds of all events.
To ensure that this operator takes scope over sentences, our system assigns them
the type 〈vp,vp〉. This has the consequence that arguments of type 〈v, t〉, such asJMaryKag, must undergo type-raising by the ↑ operator before combining with the
VP. While a VP (of type vp, that is, 〈〈v, t〉,〈v, t〉〉) could in principle combine by
functional application with a noun phrase of type 〈v, t〉, the resulting constituent
would be of type 〈v, t〉 and thus not a suitable argument to the closure operator at the
top of the tree.
The fragment defined so far allows us to analyze the sentence Mary did not sleep
as in Figure 1. The resulting formula is true just in case there is an actual event
among the anti-Mary-sleeping events. In other words, this formula states that no
sleeping event by Mary is actual; that is, Mary did not sleep.
Let us now turn to the semantics of quantifiers. We assume that all quantifiers
over invididual variables are restricted to actual (rather than non-actual) individuals;
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to avoid clutter, we omit this restriction from the formulas. Our semantics of nobody
is compositionally derived from the semantics of not and somebody, in the sense thatJnobodyKθ = λV. JnotK(JsomebodyKθ (V )).
(27) JsomebodyKθ ≡ λVλ fλe. ∃x. V (λe′. θ(e′) = x∧ f (e′))(e)
(28) JnobodyKθ ≡ λVλ fλe. e ∈ Neg(λe′. ∃x. V (λe′′. θ(e′′) = x∧ f (e′′))(e′))
(29) JeverybodyKθ ≡ λVλ fλe. ∀x. ∃e′ ≤ e. V (λe′′. θ(e′′) = x∧ f (e′′))(e′)
These quantifiers are already of type 〈vp,vp〉 and cannot be modified by the operator
↑. They combine directly with a verb phrase V to which they send information about
the individual(s) they quantify over.
Our closure operator states of only one event that it is actual. For universal
quantifiers like everybody, this creates a problem, since they quantify over a multitude
of events; when these quantifiers appear in unembedded sentences, each of these
events is actual. The entry in (29) resolves this problem in the spirit of Taylor
(1985), Schein (1993) and others, by assuming that everybody includes an existential
quantifier over parts of a sum event. It is this sum event that the closure operator
requires to be actual. We then assume that actuality distributes from sum events to
its parts. To state this formally, we assume that events are ordered by a mereological
parthood relation ≤; for details, see Champollion & Krifka (2016). Distributivity of
actuality is then ensured by the following axiom:
(30) Distributivity of Actuality Axiom
∀e. [actual(e)→∀e′ ≤ e. actual(e′)]
(Every part of any actual event is itself actual.)
In (31) through (33), we show the results of derivations for sentences of the form
Q did not leave, where Q is one of the quantifiers in (27) through (29).
(31) Somebody did not leave.
a. closure(JsomebodyKag(JnotKJleaveK))
b. ∃e. actual(e)∧∃x. e ∈ Neg(λe′. leave(e′)∧ag(e′) = x)
Formula (31b) is true just in case there exists a person who is not the agent of any
actual leaving event; that is, there is somebody who did not leave.
(32) Nobody did not leave.
a. closure(JnobodyKag(JnotKJleaveK))
b. ∃e.actual(e)∧e∈Neg(λe′.∃x.e′ ∈Neg(λe′′. leave(e′′)∧ag(e′′)= x))
Formula (32b) states that there is no actual event e′ and person x such that e′ precludes
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all leavings by x. Consider an arbitrary individual x0. According to the axiom of
negation (11), using the converse of the right-to-left direction, given that there is no
actual event that precludes all leavings by x0, it follows that some leaving by x0 is
actual. This formula is therefore true if and only if everybody left.
(33) Everybody did not leave.
a. closure(JeverybodyKag(JnotKJleaveK))
b. ∃e. actual(e)∧∀x. ∃e′ ≤ e. e′ ∈ Neg(λe′′. leave(e′′)∧ag(e′′) = x)
According to (33b), there is an actual event e which includes a subevent e′ for every
person x, such that each e′ precludes all leavings by x. Because of axiom (30), which
relates actuality to event mereology, all of the e′ are actual; hence nobody left.
While for somebody and nobody, the interpretation derived is the only available
one, the semantics for everybody in (33) only derives the surface scope reading
“Nobody left”. To derive the inverse scope reading “Not everybody left”, we
stipulate a second lexical entry for the quantifier JeverybodyK:
(34) Jeverybody’Kag ≡ λe. ∀x. (∃e′ ≤ e. ag(e′) = x)
To avoid overgenerating inverse scope readings in nonfinite clauses such as (21c), we
assume that the grammar constrains the distribution of this entry so it can only appear
in finite clauses. We leave the explanation and implementation of this constraint for
future work.
5.2 Perception reports with and without negation
In this subsection, we extend our fragment of English to account for finite and
nonfinite complements of the perception verb see. We will write see (that) to
indicate that see takes a finite complement, and simply see to indicate that it takes a
nonfinite one.
Barwise (1981) argues that finite perception reports are compatible with scenarios
in which the subject has indirect evidence of the truth of the complement and
must be accompanied by some sort of understanding, while nonfinite perception
reports require direct evidence but not necessarily understanding. We formalize
this observation by treating perception verbs with finite complements as involving
a proposition and an individual who mentally comprehends it, and by treating
perception verbs with nonfinite complements as involving a perceived event and an
individual who physically perceives it. To keep track of this difference, we write
the relevant predicates as seenonfin and seefin. Our logic is entirely standard. The
interpretation function is the usual one in the simply typed λ -calculus. In particular,
we do not need specific clauses for perception verbs, unlike, for example, van der
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Does (1991). We handle the interaction of perception verbs with negation and
quantifiers in the syntax-semantics interface.
We use the operator ∧, which maps propositions of type t to their intensions. In
a possible-worlds framework such as Montague (1974), intensions can be thought of
as functions from possible worlds to truth values. Since we are not committed to
possible worlds, we remain neutral on the implementation of ∧.
Both our lexical entries combine with a complement V of type vp, but they differ
in the way they treat it:
(35) a. Jsee (that)K≡ λVλ fλe. seefin(e)∧ th(e) = ∧[closure(V )]∧ f (e)
b. JseeK≡ λVλ fλe. seenonfin(e)∧∃e′. th(e) = e′∧V (λe′′.>)(e′)∧ f (e)
The entry (35a) combines with a finite complement. It describes a seeing event
whose theme is the (intension of the) proposition obtained by applying the closure
operator to V . That is to say, its theme is the proposition that V is satisfied by an
actual event. The entry (35b) combines with a nonfinite complement. It describes a
seeing event whose theme is an event that satisfies V .
We adopt the view favored by many semanticists on perception reports since
Barwise (1981), namely, that the nonfinite verb phrase forms a clausal constituent
with a preceding noun phrase (but see Clark & Jäger 2000 for a different view).
We introduce a second mode of composition in addition to the usual functional
application. This mode of composition, which we call Nonfinite Clause Composition,
combines a noun phrase and a nonfinite verb phrase. We assume that Nonfinite
Clause Composition is obligatorily triggered by nonfinite morphology and thus
comes to play in all and only nonfinite clauses.
Nonfinite Clause Composition forces the noun phrase constituent to take semantic
scope over the perception verb and hence over VP negation if it occurs; this accounts
for the wide scope of quantifiers we observed in (21).
(36) Nonfinite Clause Composition (NCC)
A verb phrase V of type vp and a noun phrase Q of type 〈vp,vp〉 can merge
into a constituent λPλ f . Q(λ f ′. P(λ f ′′λe.V ( f ′)(e)∧ f ′′(e))( f ))(λe′.>)
of type 〈〈vp,vp〉,vp〉.
This mode of composition corresponds to the introduction of the following (type-
raising) term in the derivation:
(37) @NCC ≡ λQλVλPλ f . Q(λ f ′. P(λ f ′′λe. V ( f ′)(e)∧ f ′′(e))( f ))(λe′. >)
For example, the meaning derived for the nonfinite clauses Mary leave and
everybody leave in (38) and (39) is as follows:
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(38) a. @NCC (↑ JMaryKag)JleaveK
b. λPλ f . P(λ f ′λe′. leave(e′)∧ag(e′) = Mary∧ f ′(e′))( f )
Because Mary is non-quantificational, this term is relatively simple: Mary leave
expects to combine with a verb P such as see, and the perceived event, which is
determined by the argument of P, will be one of Mary leaving.
(39) a. @NCC JeverybodyKJleaveK
b. λPλ fλe. ∀x. ∃e′ ≤ e. P(λ f ′λe′′. leave(e′′)
∧ ag(e′′) = x∧ f ′(e′′))( f )(e′)
Here, however, the quantifier takes scope over P. This will lead to the introduction
of one seeing event e′ for each person x. The corresponding perceived event is an
event of x leaving.
We are now in a position to analyze both finite and nonfinite perception reports,
independently of whether their complement contains a VP negation or not. First, let
us see how Serge saw Mary not leave is analyzed:
(40) a. Serge saw Mary not leave.
b. closure(↑ JSergeKexp(@NCC(↑ JMaryKag)(JnotKJleaveK)JseeK))
c. ∃e. actual(e)∧seenonfin(e)∧∃e′. th(e)= e′∧e′ ∈Neg(λe′′. leave(e′′)∧
ag(e′′) = Mary)∧ exp(e) = Serge
The derived formula is true if and only if there exists an actual event of physical
perception whose experiencer is Serge and whose theme is e′, a precluder of all
leaving-by-Mary events. This does not guarantee that e′ is actual, and hence that
Mary did not leave. To ensure this inference, we postulate the following axiom
(which is not specific to negative events):
(41) No Hallucination Axiom (nonfinite perception reports)
∀e. [seenonfin(e)∧actual(e)]→ actual(th(e))
(The theme of any actual nonfinite seeing event is itself an actual event.)
In the case at hand, this axiom ensures that e′ is actual; hence, Mary did not leave.
We now turn to quantificational noun phrases in the two types of perception
reports. We illustrate with the quantifier nobody, starting with the nonfinite case:
(42) a. Serge saw nobody leave.
b. closure(↑ JSergeKexp(@NCCJnobodyKagJleaveKJseeK))
c. ∃e. actual(e)∧ e ∈ Neg(λe′. ∃x. seenonfin(e′)∧∃e′′. th(e′) = e′′
∧ leave(e′′)∧ag(e′′) = x∧ exp(e′) = Serge)
The derived formula states that there is no actual seeing event by Serge whose theme
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is a leaving event by any person. In other words, Serge did not physically see anyone
leaving. This formula does not entail anything about whether anyone left or not,
only that no such event was perceived by Serge. This is different in the finite case:
(43) a. Serge saw (that) nobody left.
b. closure(↑ JSergeKexp(Jsee (that)K(JnobodyKagJleaveK)))
c. ∃e. actual(e)∧ seefin(e)∧ th(e) = ∧[∃e′. actual(e′)∧ e′ ∈ Neg(
λe′′. ∃x. leave(e′′)∧ag(e′′) = x)]∧ exp(e) = Serge
The formula in (43c) is true just in case Serge is experiencing a state of mental
perception (seefin) whose theme is the proposition that no one left. We encode the
fact that saw (that) is factive (in contrast to a nonfactive verb such as believe (that))
in an axiom. Here we use the ∨ operator to access the extension of the proposition in
question. In terms of Montague (1974), ∨ is the inverse of ∧; it takes an intension p
and checks whether p applies to the actual world.
(44) No Hallucination Axiom (finite perception reports)
∀e. [seefin(e)∧actual(e)]→ ∨th(e)
(The theme of any actual finite seeing event is a true proposition.)
Our fragment thus compositionally derives the correct semantics of finite and
nonfinite negative perception reports.
5.3 Reports of negative causation
We now extend our fragment so as to handle reports of negative causation such as
(6), repeated here with the subject of its nonfinite clause made explicit:
(45) Ii kept the child awake by PROi not turning off the light.
We assume that causation is a relation between events (Parsons 1990), and that the
preposition by expresses this relation. We write cause(e′,e) to state that e′ causes e.
(46) JbyK= λSλVλ fλe. V ( f )(e)∧∃e′. cause(e′,e)∧S (λe′′. >)(e′)
This applies to a nonfinite clause S of type vp and returns an adverbial of type
〈vp,vp〉, which intersects a VP V with the set of events caused by an S event. The
following axiom ensures that only actual events can serve as causes of actual events:
(47) Causal Efficacy Axiom
∀e∀e′. [cause(e′,e)∧actual(e)]→ actual(e′)
(The cause of any actual event is itself actual.)
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The formula we derive for (45) based on the LF in (48a) is given in (48b).
(48) a. closure(↑ JIiKag(JbyK(↑ JPROiKag(JnotKJturning off the lightK))
(Jkeep awakeKJthe childKexp)))
b. ∃e. actual(e)∧ag(e) = I∧ keep_awake(e)∧ exp(e) = child∧∃e′.
cause(e′,e)∧e′ ∈Neg(λe′′. ag(e′′) = I∧turn_off (e′′)∧th(e′′)= light)
(There is an actual event of the speaker keeping the child awake, and it
is caused by an event of the speaker not turning off the light.)
This formula causally relates a keeping-the-child-awake event to a negative turning-
off-the-light event by the speaker. The Causal Efficacy Axiom in (47) ensures that
this negative event is actual. Given the Axiom of Negation in (11), this in turn entails
that no turning-off-the-light event by the speaker is actual.
6 Previous work
We are aware of two authors who have proposed a non-standard formalization of
negation in event semantics: Krifka (1989) and Higginbotham (1983, 2000).
6.1 Krifka (1989): Negation based on fusion
As observed by Krifka (1989), the following sentence is ambiguous:
(49) Mary did not laugh for two hours.
On one reading, negation takes scope over the temporal adverbial; this reading states
that it is not the case that Mary laughed for two hours. On the other reading, negation
takes scope below the temporal adverbial and the sentence means that for two hours,
Mary did not laugh.
Krifka derives the two readings of (49) using a single entry for for two hours.
Since he treats for two hours as a modifier of event predicates, he needs to let Mary
did not laugh denote an event predicate. This in turn requires treating negation as
a modifier of event predicates. To this purpose, he first defines a “maximal event”
as an event that is the mereological sum, or fusion, of all events that take place
within a given time interval. Krifka’s definition of maximal event relies on the
runtime function τ , which maps events to the time intervals at which they occur; the
subinterval relation between temporal intervals, ⊆T ; and the mereological sum of a
set of events, which Krifka writes as FUSION. Krifka’s definition is as follows:
(50) ∀e. MXE(e)↔ (∃t. e = FUSIONE(λe. τ(e)⊆T t))
(An event is maximal if and only if it is the sum of all the events which
occur within some temporal interval.)
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Because such a maximal event e contains all events that happen during an
interval t, inspecting its parts is tantamount to inspecting what happened during
t. For instance, if e is a maximal event whose parts all took place during t, and if
there is no event of Mary laughing included in e, it follows that Mary did not laugh
during t. The negation of an event predicate P can now be expressed by stating that
the maximal event at a given time does not contain any event that satisfies P. The
following lexical entry relies on the mereological parthood relation between events.
(51) JnotKKrifka = λPλe. MXE(e)∧¬∃e′. (P(e′)∧ e′ ≤ e)
By combining this treatment of negation with an entry for for two hours that
essentially states that its argument is an event whose runtime is a two-hour interval,
Krifka correctly predicts the two readings of (49) depending on whether negation
takes scope above or below the temporal adverbial.
Although the maximal fusions that appear in Krifka’s account of negation appear
similar to negative events, this resemblance is only superficial (Champollion 2015).
A maximal event is the sum of everything that happened during some time interval
t. It therefore cannot be used to represent any single event that did or did not occur
during t. For example, suppose John kept his child awake by not turning off the light.
On Krifka’s system, the verb phrase not turn off the light will denote the property of
being a maximal event that does not contain any turning-off-the-light events. This
event will contain all kinds of events that bear no causal relation to John keeping
his child awake. This makes maximal events unsuitable for the analysis of negative
causation reports. Similar problems occur in connection with other phenomena such
as negative perception reports or reference to negative events.
6.2 Higginbotham (1983, 2000): Negative predicates
Because of the similarity between (52a) and (52b), Higginbotham (1983) suggests
that in some cases negation combines with a predicate P to form a “not-P” event
predicate. He credits Judith Thomson with the generalization that such pairs of
sentences are equivalent whenever the relevant verbs are antonyms.
(52) a. John saw Mary not leave.
b. John saw Mary stay.
Elaborating on this idea, Higginbotham (2000) proposes that the relation between
predicates P (such as leave) and their negated forms P (such as not leave) obeys the
following axiom, where τ sends events to their runtimes and ◦ is temporal overlap:
(53) ∀t. (¬∃e. (τ(e)◦ t ∧P(e))→ (∃e′. P(e′)∧ τ(e′) = t)
(If no P event starts or ends during t, there is a P event whose runtime is t.)
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This axiom ensures that from the absence of any P events of a given kind we can
conclude the existence of a non-P event. For example, if there is no leaving event by
Mary, then there is a non-leaving event by her.
Unlike our axiom of negation in (11), this axiom is not a biconditional. Therefore,
it allows P events and P events to co-occur. This fails to rule out models that contain
both a Mary-leaving and a Mary-not-leaving event.
Our own proposal is in the spirit of Higginbotham (2000) but improves on it in
that for us, Mary left and Mary did not leave cannot both be true (see Section 3).
7 Conclusion
Negative events have been proposed to describe the meaning of VP negation as a
way to generalize event semantic analyses to utterances with negated clauses; but it
is not clear conceptually and formally just what it means for an event to be negative.
In addition to clarifying the nature of negative events, a linguistic theory of
negative events should ensure that pairs of sentences such as Mary left and Mary did
not leave are contradictory, and should lead itself to a compositional implementation.
We have proposed that to every set of events P there corresponds a set Neg(P)
of events that cannot co-occur with any event in P. We have distinguished between
actual and nonactual events, and suggested that Neg(P) contains all events (actual or
not) which preclude every event in P from being actual. We have constrained the
function Neg so that any event in Neg(P) is actual if and only if no event in P is.
Given this, the events in Neg(P) can be thought of as anti-P events.
We have shown how Neg can be introduced by linguistic negation in the context
of a compositional syntax-semantics interface. Linguistic negation takes syntactic
scope below the subject at the surface level, but Neg needs to be able to take semantic
scope above it; we have resolved this type mismatch by using continuations.
The fragment presented here focuses on positive and negative perception reports
with ordinary and quantified subjects. We have followed Barwise (1981) in distin-
guishing two senses of see, corresponding to finite and nonfinite complements. We
have also sketched an analysis of negative causation reports.
Our formalization also readily accounts for the possibility of anaphoric reference.
We believe that the combination of the logic and the syntax-semantics interface de-
veloped here is expressive enough to compositionally handle temporal modification
or distributivity analogously for negated and non-negated constructions. For reasons
of space, we have not included these analyses here.
Future work could use the Neg function in the formalization of failing, omitting,
or refraining events (e.g. Mossel 2009; Willemsen 2016), and investigate nonclassical
logics that could be achieved by weakening the axiom of negation.
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